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Here we present an agent-based model where agents interact with other agents by playing a hybrid
of dictator and ultimatum games in a co-evolving social network. The basic assumption about the
behaviour of the agents in both of the games is that they try to attain superior socioeconomic
positions relative to other agents. As the model parameters we have chosen the relative proportions
of the dictator and ultimatum game strategies being played between a pair of agents in a single social
transaction and a parameter depicting the living costs of the agents. The motivation of the study
is to examine how different types of social interactions affect the formation of social structures and
networks, when the agents have the tendency to maximize their socioeconomic standing. We find
that such social networks of agents invariably undergo a community formation process from simple
chain-like structure to more complex networks as the living cost parameter is increased. The point
where this occurs, depends also on the relative proportion of the dictator and ultimatum games
being played. We find that it is harder for complex social structures to form when the dictator game
strategy in social transactions of agents becomes more dominant over that of the ultimatum game.
PACS numbers: 64.60.aq, 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
Studies of human social behaviour suggests that striv-
ing for superior social positions is a fundamental char-
acteristic of human nature [1], and this feature has even
measurable effects on human brain activity [2–5]. That
being the case, however, one could ask why the resultant
competition between individuals does apparently not pre-
clude humans from forming structured societies? This is
an intriguing question since humans are inherently so-
ciable and show clear tendency to form complex social
and societal structures. An obvious answer to this ques-
tion is that humans are dependent on each other for their
survival and well-being, which in turn implies that with-
out either environmental or social pressure humans would
not develop complex communities at all (see, e.g. [6] and
references within).
In order to model the societal effects of this tendency of
superiority maximisation we introduced the better-than-
hypothesis, or BTH, in [7]. As the name implies, the
working assumption of BTH is that humans are moti-
vated primarily by the aim to maximize their social sta-
tus in society, an assumption which is shared by Alfred
Adler’s school of individual psychology [8]. In [9] we dis-
covered an abrupt behavioural change in a model derived
from BTH, which could be interpreted as the formation
of social structures due to outside pressure.
Human communities are by nature connected and per-
petually changing, so they can be considered as tempo-
ral social networks of individuals. Consequently there
has been a number of attempts at the theoretical level to
model the community formation process using the net-
work theory. There are naturally many different aspects
related to the subject in addition to the influence of out-
side pressures, and thus most studies have concentrated
so far on such aspects as the roles of opinion formation
[7, 10–15], deception [16, 17] or information exchange
[18, 19].
The model we studied in [9] concerned a social network
with agents playing dictator game with their neighbours.
The agents were allowed to change their own connections,
and the model was governed by two parameters, one of
which, the memory parameter measuring how fast the
agents forget the way they were treated, and the other,
the cost parameter measuring, the proportion of money
spent on living costs. We found that when one varies
either one of these parameters the social networks pro-
duced by the model consist of disconnected chains that
lengthen until the parameters reach certain values, after
which the networks become much more connected and
complex. Such social structure formation process was
clearly visible in the shortest path length and suscepti-
bility measures plotted as functions of these parameters,
in terms of exhibiting sharp peaks at certain points.
The process of community formation has been stud-
ied previously in models of social networks, observing a
structural phase change taking place, see e.g. [10, 20–27].
In the network context phase changes are of particular
interest because of the insights they provide into various
social phenomena such as community, opinion, and hier-
archy formation. In [10], for instance, the combined effect
of co-evolving opinions and social network structure on
community and opinion formation was studied, with a
phase transition taking place as the relative influence of
the two processes was varied. Similar, but more general,
approaches were used in [26] and [27] to study the role
of homophily in the dynamics of the social networks and
in the segregation of network structures, respectively. In
2[28] hierarchy formation was presented as a result of com-
munity formation when social and cognitive constraints
were involved.
The original dictator game mentioned above is a prob-
lem in decision theory first proposed in [29], where one of
the players, the dictator, is tasked with dividing a fixed
reward between the players at will. It is different from
the closely related ultimatum game [30], in which the
other player, called accepter in the context of the game,
is allowed to either reject or accept the offer. In case of
rejection, neither player gets anything, while in the case
of acceptance the division is realised as it stands. Both
games were constructed to demonstrate the limitations
of rational economic behaviour.
The ultimatum and dictator games allow the testing
of human economic behaviour, especially the assumption
of rationality (see e.g.[31] and [32]). Providing that hu-
mans rationally seek to maximize their own profits, in the
dictator game the dictators should reserve everything for
themselves, while in the ultimatum game one could ex-
pect that the accepter should accept any nonzero amount
offered, and that the proposers should offer the minimum
possible amounts. However, in the actual experiments
with real humans the proposers in the ultimatum game
and dictators of the dictator game have a tendency to
offer substantial amounts to the other player, and un-
balanced propositions in the ultimatum game (especially
those in favour of the proposer) tend to be rejected by the
accepters (see, for example, [33–36]). These results im-
mediately raise the question on the rationality assump-
tion of human behaviour. As we argued in [7], assum-
ing humans to rationally seek superior position over the
others means in the case of the ultimatum game that ac-
cepters should accept offers of over 1/3 of the full amount,
and that the proposers should realise this and adjust their
offers accordingly.
In this study we extend our earlier model presented
in [9] by letting the agents play ultimatum game as well
as dictator game, and take a look at the effects this has
on the observed social structure and network formation.
The motivation for this study is to test, how different
modes of social interactions change the structures and
dynamics of social networks of humans following the bet-
ter than hypothesis (BTH).
This paper is organised such that in the next Section II
we define the network model of agents playing the game
with a strategy that is a hybrid of the ultimatum and
dictator game strategies. This is followed by the simu-
lation results presented in Section III. Finally we draw
conclusions in Section IV.
II. NETWORK MODEL OF AGENTS PLAYING
ULTIMATUM AND DICTATOR GAMES
Let us consider a set of linked agents forming a so-
cial network and playing a hybrid of the ultimatum and
dictator game with all their network neighbours. In both
the ultimatum and dictator game each agent has its indi-
vidual offering rate xi, while in the case of the ultimatum
game each agent has in addition a threshold yi for accept-
ing the offer (see [37]). In our hybrid model we assume
that each agent has a choice between two different social
strategies, playing either the dictator game or the ulti-
matum game with their neighbors, between which they
make the choice at random. The simulation proceeds in
cycles, in each of which the agents play either the dicta-
tor game with probability d or the ultimatum game with
probability (1−d), with all the agents they are connected
to. The game being played is chosen independently for
each transaction between the agents, so the agent i could
play ultimatum game with agent j and dictator game
with agent k in a single cycle. The nth cycle is denoted
by Tn. The agents will always play in the same order.
The hybrid double strategy model differs from the sin-
gle strategy model of Ref. [9] such that with probability
(1 − d), when the ultimatum game is played, the agent
receiving the offer gets the choice of either accepting or
rejecting the division of funds offered by the proposing
agent. Then if the agent i makes an offer to agent j the
transaction occurs if either the dictator game is played
or if in case of the ultimatum game xi ≥ yj . In the case
the division of funds is realised the accumulated wealth
vi and vj of the agents i and j, respectively, change as
follows:
vi(t1) = vi(t0) + (1− xi)M, (1)
vj(t1) = vj(t0) + xiM, (2)
where M is the amount of funds to be divided in each
transaction and t0 is the time before the transaction and
t1 is the time immediately after it. In each cycle of the hy-
brid game, the amount cM , denoting the ”living costs”,
is deducted from the accumulated wealth of the agents,
such that the wealth of an agent can only be reduced
to zero. Here the cost parameter c turns out to be very
important in shaping the structure of the network when
the game is played. Different values of the relative pro-
portions d and (1 − d) of the dictator and ultimatum
games played by the agents correspond to different rules
of social interaction while the parameter c can be inter-
preted as an external pressure or need forcing the agents
to cooperate.
Now, the wealth acquired by the agent i in a cycle can
be written as follows,
vi(Tn+1) = max
(
vi(Tn) + M
( ∑
j∈χ̂ji
(1− xi)
+
∑
j∈χ̂ij
xj − c
)
, 0
)
, (3)
where χ̂ij is the set of those neighbours of the agent i
that will accept or are forced to accept (depending on
whether the agent i gets to play either the ultimatum or
dictator game with agent j) the offer xi, and, conversely,
χ̂ji is the set of the neighbouring agents’ offers xj the
3agent i is either willing or forced to accept. If the full
set of agents is denoted by I and the set of neighbours of
agent i denoted by mi, χ̂ij can be written as follows
χ̂ij = mi ∩ χij , (4)
where χij is the set of all agents that either accept or are
forced to accept the offer xi, i.e.
χij = {j ∈ I|xi ≥ yj ∨Dij(Tn) ≤ d}, (5)
where Dij(Tn) is a random variable that determines,
whether the agent i gets to play the dictator or the ulti-
matum game with agent j.
Next, according to the BTH (Better Than Hypothesis),
the agents compare themselves to other agents on the
basis of their accumulated wealth. To do this we define
the utility function of agent i at cycle Tn as follows
Ui(Tn) = vi(Tn) +
∑
l∈mi
(vi(Tn)− vl(Tn)) (6)
Then, we can determine the contribution by the agent
j to the utility of agent i, and write it in the following
cumulative form
Uij(Tn+1) = Uij(Tn) + aijU
′
ij(Tn+1), (7)
where aij is an element of the adjacency matrix of the
the network of agents:
aij =
{
1, if agents i and j are linked
0, otherwise,
(8)
and
U ′ij(Tn+1) =


(ki(Tn)− nJ + 1)xj(Tn)M
− (vj(Tn+1)− vj(Tn)),
if xj ≥ yi ∨Dij(Tn) ≤ d,
− (vj(Tn+1)− vj(Tn)), otherwise
(9)
where nJ is the number of neighbouring agents that
agents i and j have in common, i.e. agents in J =
mi ∩mj .
The agents choose their offering rate xi and the ac-
ceptance threshold yi according to Eq. (6) using a mix
of simple hill-climbing and random walk methods. The
agents have the values of xi and yi assigned randomly
to them at the start of the simulations, and they seek
to find better values by choosing a random direction on
the (xi, yi)-plane and changing their xi and yi values to
that direction as long as their utility (6) is growing, i.e.
∆Ui(Tn) = Ui(Tn) − Ui(Tn−1) remains positive. When
∆Ui becomes negative, the agents choose randomly a new
direction to proceed. The whole process can then be writ-
ten in the following form:
xi(Tn+1) = xi(Tn) + δs(Tn) cos(φi)
yi(Tn+1) = yi(Tn) + δs(Tn) sin(φi), (10)
(a)
(b)
(c)
FIG. 1: The structure of co-evolving social network of 100
agents interacting socially by playing at random and at the
same rate (d = 0.5) either the dictator or ultimatum games.
The three panels show a snapshot of the structure after 10000
time steps for cost parameter values c = 0.3 (panel (a)), and
c = 1.1 (panel (b)) and c = 3.0 (panel(c)).
where δs(T ) is the length of the step the agents take into
their chosen direction φi. As stated, the direction φi is
the angle that is reassigned a different value every time
∆Ui is negative, i.e.
φi(Tn+1) =
{
φi(Tn), if ∆i ≥ 0
φr , otherwise,
(11)
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FIG. 2: The shortest path length and the susceptibility in the pure ultimatum (d = 0; (a) and (b)) and dictator (d = 1; (c)
and (d)) modes as function of the cost parameter c, for for four different network sizes with total number of agents N shown
in the legend.
where 0 ≤ φr ≤ 2pi is chosen randomly. In the pure
dictator game mode (d = 1) the acceptance threshold
yi is not used, and the direction of change of the offer-
ing rate xi is flipped every time ∆Ui is negative. The
initial directions of change of the offering rate can be ei-
ther increasing or decreasing, and offers are made to all
the agents at random. As for the step length δs(T ), it
is in all cases linearly reduced from 0.11 to 0.01 in the
course of the first 1000 time steps using simulated an-
nealing technique. The idea here is that the agents first
try to find their offering and acceptance preferences in
a very rough manner, before gradually starting a more
fine-tuned search.
In addition to the above described transaction dynam-
ics between the pairs of agents, i and j, there is a second
dynamical process in which these agents redefine their
social relations after each cycle based on their current
utilities, Uij and Uji. This is realised such that the agent
i will form a social link with the agent j if both utilities
Uij and Uji are non-negative, provided that the link be-
tween them does not already exist. Similarly, the agent
i will cut an existing link with agent j, if Uij ≤ 0. This
second dynamics together with the transaction dynamics
constitutes the co-evolution of social network structure.
In the next section we present the results of compre-
hensive computer simulations of the model of networked
agents interacting socially with their linked neighbors by
playing a hybrid of ultimatum and dictator games. Our
main focus in these simulations is to get insight into the
co-evolving social network structure and community for-
mation behavior therein.
III. RESULTS
In Fig. 1 we present the simulation results for the
structure of the co-evolving social network of N = 100
agents having played the dictator and ultimatum game
with equal probability d = 0.5 and with for three different
values of the cost parameter c = 0.3, 1.1, and 3.0 for the
total of 10000 time steps. Here one observes that when
the cost parameter c is increased the system experiences a
structural change from a collection of mostly simple pairs
of agents to longer chains and eventually to connected
complex networks. Similar structural phase change or
transition is observed for all values of the probability d.
In essence what happens is that the short chains of agents
lengthen until they start joining to other chains and be-
come more and more entangled and then networked. This
resembles the phase transition due to the crystallization
process in freezing liquids.
In order to investigate such a network formation pro-
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FIG. 3: The shortest path length and the susceptibility as functions of the probabilities d and (1− d) of the dictator game and
ultimatum game being played by the agents, the number of which is N = 50, 100, 150, 200, 500, and 1000. Here the living cost
parameter c = 0.75, 1.0, 1.25, 1.5, and 1.75.
cess in more detail we focus our attention to the shortest
path length L and to the susceptibility 〈s〉, of which the
latter is defined as the second moment of s-sized clus-
ters, excluding the largest connected component of the
network:
〈s〉 =
∑
s nss
2∑
s nss
. (12)
To calculate L and 〈s〉, we have done the simulations
up to 10000 time steps, letting the system reaching the
stationary state for the first 5000 time steps and then
taking the averages over the last 5000 time steps for dif-
ferent numbers of agents N = 50, 100, 150, 200, 500
and 1000. For sufficiently reliable statistics we have per-
formed 100 simulation runs for agent populations up to
N = 200, while for N = 500, 1000 we could reasonably
perform only 10 and 5 runs, respectively. It should be
noted that in systems showing phase transition near their
phase transition or critical point, there are large fluctua-
tions and the time evolution of the system tend to show
critical slowing-down phenomenon. In this situation to
get accurate results one would need to run the system
longer, which is unfortunately beyond the computational
resources at our disposal. Nevertheless, we believe that
our calculations of L and 〈s〉 are sufficiently accurate in
characterising the social structure and network formation
process.
6In Fig. 2 we show the averages of the shortest path
length and susceptibility for the pure dictator (d = 1)
and ultimatum game (d = 0) models as the functions of
the cost c for several agent populations N . For the ul-
timatum game strategy (Fig. 2 a) and b)) we observe
a strong peak in both L and 〈s〉 at c ≈ 0.6, which be-
comes stronger with increasing number N agents. The
fact that the height of the peak increases with the size
of the network suggests that in the network formation
process the change in structure could be characterised as
a phase transition. The situation is quite similar for the
dictator game strategy (Fig. 2 c) and d)) but now the
peaks of L and 〈s〉 are broader such that the point of
phase change or transition is less well defined, occuring
at c ≈ 2.
Next we investigate the behaviour of the hybrid model
in situation where the agents play with different proba-
bilities or different proportions of ultimate and dictator
game strategies. In Fig. 3 we depict the shortest path
length and susceptibility as a function of the probability
d for five different values of the cost parameter c = 0.75
1.0, 1.25, 1.5, and 1.75. In this figure we observe broad
peaks in both quantities for all the cost parameter c val-
ues. As observed in Fig. 2 as the function of c, both the
shortest path length L and susceptibility 〈s〉 peak rises
strongly when the number of agents N in the network in-
creases. Also a significant feature is that the peak seems
to occur at higher values of probability d as the cost c
is increased, such that for c = 0.75 the peak occurs at
d ≈ 0.25 while for c = 1.75 at d ≈ 0.95.
In Fig. 4 we take a closer look at how the average
degree, the shortest path length and the susceptibility
behave for three different game strategy proportions, i.e.
d = 0 (pure ultimatum strategy), d = 0.5 (equal mix
of ultimatum and dictator strategies) and d = 1 (pure
dictator strategy) in the neighbourhood of the respec-
tive phase transition points, where the shortest path
length and susceptibility are reaching their maximal val-
ues, marked in Fig. 4 (a) and (b) with vertical lines. In
Fig. 4 (c) we approximate the phase transition points
(marked also with vertical lines) to occur, when the av-
erage degree rises above the value of 2, because up to
that point the social structure is mostly chain-like and
after that it becomes more entangled and network, i.e.
network formation takes place. We see that for the pure
ultimatum strategy (d = 0) case the maxima of the short-
est path length and susceptibility occur relatively close
to the value of the cost c at which the average degree rises
above 2, while for equal mix of ultimatum and dictator
strategy (d = 0.5) and for pure dictator strategy (d = 1)
the values of the cost c seem to deviate of the order of 15
%.
The results presented in Figs. 2, 3 and 4 allow us to
draw a rough phase diagram for the system, as depicted
in Fig. 5, for the pair of model parameters, i.e. the living
cost parameter c and relative proportions, d and (1 − d)
of the dictator and ultimatum games, respectively. The
phases depicted in the figure concern the changes in the
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FIG. 4: The average degree (panel (a)), The shortest path
length (panel (a)), susceptibility (panel (b)) and average de-
gree (panel (c)) near the phase transition points for pure
ultimatum (d = 0), equal mix of ultimatum and dictator
(d = 0.5) and pure dictator game strategies (d = 1). The
vertical lines show either maximal values of the shortest path
length and susceptibility, or the points at which the average
degree exceeds the value of 2.
network structure such that in the upper part of the curve
one obtains mostly chains, while in the lower part there
are networks connected with more than two neighbors.
The point at which the average degree of agents surpasses
the value 2 is taken to represent the onset of the complex
network formation. Since the exact parameter values at
which this happens are essentially never captured in the
numerical data, the linear interpolation is used to esti-
mate where the crossings of average degree value 2 take
place. The resultant curve, depicted as a solid line in Fig.
5, runs approximately from point (0.6, 0) to (2.1, 1), in a
monotonically rising but sub-linear manner.
Due to the rough nature of the linear interpolation
used to construct the phase transition (solid) line in Fig.
5, we were not able to make any reasonable error esti-
mates in this case. To gain some idea on the size of the
errors, we used a Monte Carlo method to obtain an al-
ternative phase transition curve and its error estimates.
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FIG. 5: Phase diagram in the (c, d)-plane for N = 100, calcu-
lated by using two different methods. The solid line shows the
estimate from linear interpolation, while the dashed line with
the error bars shows the results of the Monte Carlo method.
We did this by selecting five values of the cost c = 0.75,
1.0, 1.25, 1.5 and 1.75, and then by randomly choosing
values for d in close vicinity of the phase curve indicated
by the linear interpolation method. Running the simula-
tions with N = 100 agents for 100 times we got a value
for the average degree for thus chosen pair of parameters,
and if this exceeded the value of 2 by small enough mar-
gin (less than 0.1 to be exact), the parameter pair was
stored. Repeating these steps we obtained for each of the
chosen values of c an ensemble of values of d, for which
the mean and standard deviation could be calculated. If
the ensemble seemed to terminate at the limits of the
search area, the search area was expanded until the en-
semble fitted within it. The mean values for d acquired
in this way are shown in Fig. 5 as asterisks connected by
a dashed line, and the standard deviations provide the
error bar estimates. Finally, the number of points from
which the means and standard deviations were calculated
ranged from 48 (c = 1.75) to 116 (c = 1.0).
As seen in Fig. 5, the results of the Monte Carlo
method agree rather closely with those obtained by linear
interpolation, though the difference between the meth-
ods, small as it is, increases as c increases. The errors,
as given by the Monte Carlo method turn out to be rel-
atively small: in most cases they barely exceed the size
of the asterisk markers. The convergence of the results
of the two methods and the small errors mean that the
phase diagram shown in Fig. 5 can be considered reason-
ably accurate.
The reason why the complex network structure forma-
tion occurs at different points for the ultimatum and dic-
tator game models is that in the former case, the agents
need to take into account the possibility of rejection when
making their proposals, while in the latter case they do
not need to do that. For any values of the relative propor-
tions d and (1− d) of the dictator and ultimatum games
being played, respectively, the network formation occurs
when the number of neighbours needed to make profit is
more than 2, and so the chains change into complex so-
cial networks. In the case of the dictator game the agents
need at least ⌊c⌋ neighbours using similar division strate-
gies to make any profit (as argued in [9]), consequently
it is there where the complex network structure forma-
tion occurs, as seen in Fig. 5. When d < 1, the agents
need more than ⌊c⌋ relations because some of them might
decide to turn down the offers and consequently the the
network structure formation will occur at a lower value
of the living cost parameter c.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this study using an agent-based model we have ex-
amined how different types of social interactions between
agents playing a hybrid of dictator and ultimatum strate-
gies affect the formation of social structures and net-
works, when the agents have the tendency to maximize
their socioeconomic standing and redefine mutual social
relations based on their individual utilities. Our main
focus has been on the observed structural change in the
social connectivity of agents taking place from the chains
to more complex network structure when the living cost
parameter c is increased. This structural change is inter-
preted as a phase transition as it manifests itself as peaks
in the shortest path length and susceptibility of the co-
evolved social network. We have found that for both the
pure ultimatum game and dictator game strategies, this
transition occurs for the cost of living of c ≈ 0.6 and
c ≈ 2, respectively. Setting the parameter c between
these values and plotting the susceptibility and shortest
path length as a function of the relative proportions d
and (1 − d) of the dictator and ultimatum game strate-
gies, respectively, revealed a broad peak that indicates
a similar network formation taking place in this case as
well.
The discovery of the shift in the transition point of
social structure formation as a function of the relative
proportions, d and (1 − d), the two strategies have been
played has implications for the applicability of BTH-style
models to real human societies, the most profound of
which relates to the role of the ground rules of social
interactions in the formation of social structures. The
fact that the threshold for complex network structure
formation has a lower value for the living cost parame-
ter c when the ultimatum game becomes more prevalent,
means that in that case the agents are generally more in-
clined towards forming complex societies than when the
dictator game is predominant. As the ultimatum game
could be characterised to be more reciprocal than the
dictator game, given that both players get to make a de-
cision regarding the division of funds, one could draw the
conclusion that reciprocity in social interactions makes it
easier for the agents to form more complex communities.
This is, indeed, a promising result for BTH, since one
8would intuitively expect this to be the case in the real
human societies. Finally judging from our numerical re-
sults, the simulated societies based on purely dictatorial
social interactions need more than thrice the amount of
external pressure to maintain complex social structures
than those based on ultimatums.
In order to further study the effect of reciprocity on
social structure formation under BTH one would need to
define a measure for the reciprocity of social interaction
types, such as the dictator and ultimatum games, and
then study the propensity of social structure formation
as a function of this measure. However, defining such a
measure is beyond the scope of the present study, as is
the devising of new social interactions that would have
different ratings on that measure, as would be necessary
for the aforementioned future research.
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